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disinterestedness requirements as to the operating trustee, it should solve the
more significant and larger problem of providing for the efficient operation
of the enterprise without concurrently placing investigation and plan formu-
lation in biased hands.
FORMULATION OF A PLAN UNDER SECTION 77
SECTIOn 77 of the Bankruptcy Acts1 was enacted hurriedly in the closing
days of the last Hoover Congress to provide machinery for the conservation
and reorganization of financially embarrassed railroads. In 1935, the Sec-
tion was revised sentence by sentence,2 and now represents a carefully con-
sidered attempt to improve upon the old equity receivership which has served
as the vehicle for reorganizing over 1,000 carriers since 187. 3 This Com-
ment will be confined to comparison of equity methods with tile new pro-
cedure for formulating a reorganization plan and to suggestions aimed at
retaining the better features of both.
The directors and investment bankers who held the purse strings of the
road precipitated the typical equity receivership through a suit in which a
friendly creditor lent his name to a creditor's bill brought before a federal
judge who appointed a receiver, usually an officer of the corporation, to oper-
ate the company and protect its assets from dissipation. 4 A plan of reorgani-
zation was then worked out by the bankers as reorganization managers, and
approved by protective committees which had obtained depLits of certificates
from investors. To circumvent dissenting security holders, resort was had to
"judicial sale" of the railroad-a foreclosure instituted by the bondholders.5
1. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §205 (1934).
2. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. §205 (Supp. 193tu0.
3. Thirty-one major roads were reorganizd hetwcen 191t anrd 1933, when the
new statute was enacted. See speech by Inter~tate 0mC'rn ee Cmmissioner (then
Chairman) Mahaffie, as reported in X. Y. Tines. Xov. 12. l93f. p. 39. cl. 4,
Use of the equity receivership to facilitat. railroad reoranizatins coonstituted a
notable chapter in the history of American "high-finance." Speculative investment and
overexpansion of physical property necessitated constant readjustment of financial struc-
tures. involving an exchange of securities and reduction of fixed charges.
See generally on the history and technique of the receivership, DEw.;, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 1140 ct seq.
4. Cravath, The Reorganiration of Corporations, in SonIE LEGAL PHASES OF CoR-
POATE FiNAxCiNG, REORGANIZATION AND REGrLATIOX (1917) 156-161; DEW.G, Op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 1119.
5. A judicial sa!e based on the upset price was the hub of the equity receivership.
The reorganization managers controlled through the protective committees a substantial
number of the first layer of bonds upon which default had been made. Foreclosure pro-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Legally, dissenting security holders were entitled to no more than a propor-
tional cash share of the "upset price" at which the property was foreclosed.
This pro rata division amounted to so little that dissenters were often forced
to enter the reorganization and accept the new securities.0 The new company,
in whose name the reorganization managers had purchased the property, then
proceeded to exchange new securities for old on the basis of the agreed plan.
The equity process was unsatisfactory to the banker-reorganizer, the in-
vestor and the public. In using the creditor's bill as an elaborate attempt to
simulate legal combat, the reorganizer was constantly beset by procedural
pitfalls.7 Unfriendly state receiverships prior to the prearranged federal pro-
ceedings might divide the railroad into several sections, each under the cus-
tody of a separate state court.8 Even when administration of the property
was successfully maneuvered into a federal tribunal, the latter's jurisdiction
was limited to a single district, and cumbersome ancillary receiverships were
required.9 In addition, decisions of the Supreme Court tended to magnify
the theoretical rights of disapproving creditors. 10 Despite the judicial sale,
minorities possessed sufficient power to exact valuable concessions, especially
since depression capital markets made large cash payments to dissenters pro-
hibitive.
Investors often had little voice in the disposition of their property. 1 The
proceedings were dominated by investment bankers, who were prompted by
a practical desire to take care of issues they had sponsored,12 and sometimes
ceedings were instituted by a selected bondholder in the receivership court. The judge
fixed an "upset price" well beyond the reach of any independent purchaser group, but
far below the real value of the road. Instead of bidding to the full amount of the
bonds under their control, the reorganizers offered only enough bonds to equal a figure
slightly above the upset price, and purchased the property on behalf of the new company.
See generally Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization (1919) 32 HARv. L.
REV. 489.
6. The dissenter's dilemma is fully discussed in LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS
(1933) 292.
7. See address by Robert T. Swaine to Annual Meeting of Railway Accounting
Officers at Detroit, July 1, 1936, published by the Association of American Railroads.
8. See Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 341 (U. S. 1865).
9. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress,
61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
10. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1868); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Louisville & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd,
228 U. S. 482 (1913); see Cravath, supra note 4, 191-198; Swaine, Reorgattization of
Corporations: Certain Developmenwts of the Last Decade in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANTIZATION AND REGULATION (1926-1930) 133. See also
note 40 infra.
11. The abuses affecting investors are fully discussed in Report of Coordinator
Eastman to the I. C. C., Doc. No. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 3; LOWENTHAL, ThE
INVESTOR PAYS (1933) ; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROTEcr-
IVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMrITTEES (1936-1937) Part I.
12. But see S. E. C. REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 11, Part I, 874, asserting that this
"moral obligation" to sponsored issues was merely an excuse for seizing control of the
reorganization machinery.
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sought to maintain profitable connections and share in the liberal reorgani-
zation fees. Protective committees were formed and their personnel chosen
at the suggestion of the bankers. Lists of security holders were available only
to the bankers' committees. Deposits of securities were obtained by h.igh pres-
sure methods, and depositors bound in advance to whatever plan the commit-
tees adopted. Some of the new money exacted from stockholders provided
exorbitant fees for the reorganization managers and their attorneys. 13 Since
the old management controlled the formation of the new enterprise, assets
in the form of mismanagement suits against officers, directors, and bankers
were rarely realized.' 4
Aside from the protection of investors, public welfare requires a stable
financial reconstruction in order to assure maintenance of efficient service.
Yet the new capitalizations established by the plans were often more unsound
than the old.' The Interstate Commerce Commission had no power to pro-
tect the public interest in reorganizations until 1920, when the reorganized
company, at the very end of receivership, was required to obtain Commission
approval of its new securities.1" Due in part to the reluctance of the Com-
mission to interfere with a plan so near fulfillment, such applications were
invariably allowed.17
Faced with a number of imminent reorganizations in 1933, reorganizers
and reformers alike sought new legislation going beyond the existing equity
process. 18 The present statute, based upon the bankruptcy power of Congress,
embodies suggestions of all groups concerned. Although it does not pre-
13. Reorganization of the Western Pacific (1915-16) cost V,000,000; the Wabash
(1911-1916) $3,449,500, Pere Marquette (1912-1917) $2,679,000. The all-time high was
recorded by the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul (1925-28), whose expenses were esti-
mated variously from $4,950,060 to I6,495,000. See Paxton, Railroad Recciverships ard
Reorganizations (1933) 1 ED. RzSwRCH REP. 23, 23.
14. See (1937) 47 YAE L J. 285 at 286.
15. Eight railroads reorganized between 1915 and 1933 had larger capitalizations
after reorganization than before. See Mahaffie, supra note 3.
16. Section 20a of the Transportation Act, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a
(1934), gives the Commission power to approve all issues of securities. See note 59,
infra.
17. "The Commission has not rejected outright any of the forty odd plans submitted
to it since 1920, though in a few cases it has required minor changes." MouLTon, Tna
AmERiCAN TRANSPORTATION PaoBTF (1933) 325.
18. Solicitor General Thacher had commenced work on the measure as early as
1931. The original draft embodied mainly those changes sought by the reorganizers,
but the statute passed in 1933 contained many suggestions of the reformers as well. See
Swaine, supra note 7. The amendments of 1935 went even further toward reform by
way of government intervention.
For discussion of the 1933 act, see Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorgani:ation Act
(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 18; Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corpora-
tions Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL. L REV. 571; WVehle, Rail-
road Reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act: New Legislation Suggest-
ed (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 197. The 1935 Amendments are analyzed by Craven and Fuller,
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dude recourse to the old equity procedure, it affords an alternative and more
effective device for the rehabilitation of financially embarrassed roads. Under
Section 77, as amended, reorganization proceedings are initiated by the debtor
railroad in a federal district court, which takes jurisdiction over the entire
property of the road."' Subject to the ratification of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, a trustee is appointed by the court.20 Within six months, the
railroad must submit a plan of reorganization to the Commission, and per-
mission may be obtained by all interested parties to intervene in the hearings
held before the Commission upon the feasibility of the plan, 1 Protective
committees, however, may not solicit proxies or deposits until after Commis-
sion investigation and consent.22 The Commission then approves a plan which
may be different from any of those suggested, but which must conform to
certain standards set by the act, the most important being that fixed charges
shall be adequately covered by the probable prospective earnings of the road.2 3
The Commission's report is certified to the court, which in turn hears objec-
tions of all interested parties. If the judge disapproves the plan, it is referred
to the Commission for further action, but should the plan be found to comply
with the equitable rights of the parties, the court instructs the Commission to
submit the proposal to the interested creditors and stockholders for their
approval. The results are then transmitted to the court, and the plan may
be confirmed if two-thirds of each class concerned have signified their assent,
or, in the absence of such assent, if the judge finds, inter alia, that the plan
"makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment of the interests
or claims of all those rejecting it."'24 Exhaustive provisions cover the execu-
tion of a confirmed plan. Finally, the fees fixed by the court for compensa-
tion of trustees, committees and their attorneys must be within maximum
limits set by the Commission.25
Among the acknowledged achievements of Section 77 is the elimination of
procedural difficulties incident to the use of the creditor's bill, and the substi-
tution therefor of machinery designed especially for reorganization. Another
objective of the reorganizers was realized by making it possible under the act
for two-thirds or less of any class of securities to bind dissenters and pro-
ceed with reorganization. This provision, however, has not yet been utilized.20
Replacement of the friendly receiver with a qualified trustee has also met with
The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law (1936) 49 HARV. L. RIv. 1254;
Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936) 36 COL. L. Rsv. 27;








26. See discussion in articles cited supra note 18.
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general approval..27 But major problems have been encountered in consum-
mating, under Commission leadership, a reorganization plan which composes
private disputes and yet is compatible with the public interest.
One objective of Section 77 was to accelerate the process of reorganiza-
tion,28 which in the average equity receivership consumed from three and one-
half to four and one-half years.29 Streamlined reorganization was intended in
the provision for submitting a plan within six months,30 and in the various de-
vices for dispensing with consents of security-holders. 3t But despite these
attempts at efficiency,32 proceedings under the Act have not been svift.p
Thirty-one railroads, including eighteen Class I properties,34 have filed under
Section 77, but only three small roads have emerged successfully reorgan-
ized.as In one case, the petition of the debtor was dismissed. The other
twenty-seven occupy various stages upon the docket of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. Although the Act requires that plans be submitted within
six months, the average lapse between the filing of a petition and the offer
of a plan has been a year and a quarter, while four companies which entered
in 1935 or earlier have tendered no proposals whatsoever. Plans submitted
to the Commission have been referred to its Bureau of Finance for hearings
and a report. Twenty-two debtors, thirteen of them Class I roads, have
appeared before the Finance Bureau. In three cases, hearings have been sus-
pended at the request of the parties. In nine, including only one major prop-
erty, the Bureau has concluded its investigations and recommended a plan
to the Commission. The remaining ten, all Class I carriers, are still upon
the Finance Docket, and have been there for an average of a year and a half
since the filing of a plan.
Delay in the filing of a reorganization plan may be excused on several
grounds. The six months rule was not inserted until 1935. Hasty reorgani-
27. See (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 285.
28. The Supreme Court, in Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 685 (1935), interpreted the original act as requiring, above
all, that reorganizations be speedy. It was felt, however, that this decision put more
emphasis on haste than was desirable. H. IL REP. No. 1283, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)
3. Subsection (g) of the present act authorizes dismissal only if there is "undue delay
in a reasonably expeditious reorganization of the debtor."
29. See I. C. C., Bureau of Statistics, Statement No. 2864, File No. 52-A-2; I. C. C.
ANN. REP. o N STATisrlcs or RAmwAYs IN U. S.
30. § 77d.
31. §77e.
32. § 77b, c (4) (5) (10) (11) were also designed to make reorganizations more
efficient.
33. See a typical "financial" editorial objecting to the delay in the Vall St. Jour-
nal, Jan. 13, 1937, p. 4, col. 1.
34. Class I railroads operate 93% of the total mileage in the United States, and earn
about 97% of the total revenues. RAILWAY AND INDUSTRIAL COMMUMDIt (May, 1937) 8.
35. The Copper Range, the Reader, and the Chicago, South Shore and South Bend.
The first two are owned by a mining and a lumber company respectively, while the
third is an electric interurban line. The largest operates but 113 miles of track.
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zation during the depression period was not encouraged, for plans based upon
the abnormally low earnings up to 1935 would have required such sacrifices
by security holders as to make rejection by them certain; and the act was
intended to provide a haven in which distressed roads could weather depres-
sion storms.3 6 But once a plan has been filed and hearings commenced the
delay cannot be justified upon this ground. Continued inability to consum-
mate a plan has been ascribed to hopelessly low revenues, but income for
1936 and 1937 has approached the 1930 average T without any noticeable ac-
celeration of proceedings. Although in a few instances earnings have lagged
and the parties themselves are unwilling to hasten matters, there are many
others in which everyone concerned is anxious for a speedy solution. In these
cases it is difficult to determine any single factor which is responsible for
the protraction of the rehabilitation process.
The reasons for delay can be ascertained only by an examination of the
problems encountered and the methods used by the Commission in the formu-
lation of a plan. And since speed is a subordinate objective to the consum-
mation of an equitable reorganization satisfactory to all interests, a charge
more serious than delay is that the Bureau's manner of conducting hearings
has failed to result in plans upon which the parties have been persuaded to
agree.
Whenever investor-groups are so well organized as to make their co-opera-
tion indispensable to a successful reconstruction, negotiation toward an agree-
ment among owners of all classes of securities has been an objective of
reorganization managers.38 If railroad earnings fail to meet debt charges,
various creditors possess theoretical remedies of uncertain value. Long law-
suits would be required to assert them, and foreclosure of a mortgage upon
one division of a railroad would be useless. Investments can be recovered
only through rehabilitation of the property and resumption of interest and
dividend payments. Therefore the inevitable conflict between vengeful action
to enforce remedies and the more practical desire to restore the company's
credit usually results in adoption of the latter course. Senior bondholders
must negotiate with junior interests to prevent delay and sometimes to obtain
new money. They must decide what terms to accept. Similarly, junior cred-
itors possess certain subordinate rights. Their power to demand a cash pay-
ment based upon the sale value of the property 9 is tempered by their desire
36. See discussion by the authors of the 1935 Amendments in Craven and Fuller,
supra note 18, at 1262-5.
37. See RAILWAY & INDUSTRIAL COMPENDIUM (May 1937) 8 et seq.
38. For a penetrating analysis of these inter-class relations, see Foster, Conflicling
Ideals for Reorganication (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923; Dodd, Reorganization Through
Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48 HARV. L. Rzv. 1100.
39. Formerly this value was the "upset price" set by the court (see note 5 supra),
but now value must be fixed by the Commission, "determined on a basis which will give
due consideration to the earning power of the property, past, present, and prospective,
and all other relevant facts"' Not too much emphasis is to be placed upon reproduction
cost new or upon original cost. § 77e. See Craven and Fuller, supra note 18, at 1272.
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to secure a better settlement by obtaining new securities which will reflect
any increase in earnings. They too are anxious for compromise. Although
the stockholders have no legal right to consideration unless the corporation is
solvent,40 their strategic power to block reorganization makes their coopera-
tion desirable. They must often be relied upon as the source of new money,
and in return must be granted representation in the new company. Were
they to be eliminated, either a cash payment based upon their equity in the
property, or long delay while the company was being adjudicated insolvent,41
would be required. All interests have power to command a share in the new
enterprise, and all have much to lose by obstinacy and delay. The stage is
set for bargaining.
The banker-management group which dominated the equity receivership
had perfected an effective machinery for the elimination or compromise of
many of the natural conflicts among investor-classes. By judicious dispen-
sation of patronage, the vital support of the mortgage trustees and the pro-
tective committees was obtained.4V 2 The bankers were the medium through
which the different classes of security holders resolved their disputes. 3 Minor
opponents to the projected plan were bought off or smothered, and the major
conflicts were settled by bargaining and mutual concession. The plan finally
presented to the court usually had the approval and active support of all the
spokesmen for majority groups. Like a well-organized political machine, the
bankers selected the ticket and brought out the votes.
40. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 4,- (1913) is the leading case on the
"trust fund" principle. See Wehle, supra note 18, at 208. This oft-cited case held that
where the stockholders, who stand below the unsecured creditor in the hierarchy of legal
priorities, are given new stock upon payment of an assessment, while the unsecured
creditor received nothing, the latter might follow the assets of the old company into the
hands of the new, and recover the amount of his claim against the new corporation.
Cravath, in 1916, described the Boyd case as a "veritable demon incarnate standing
across the path of the reorganizers," but a decade later Swaine, supra note 10, ques-
tioned whether the demon had not become "reasonably domesticated.'
41. Subsection e. See the comment made by Commissioner Mahaffie on the amount
that it would have cost the St. Louis-San Francisco to discover that it was legally in-
solvent. Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 7r, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 126. On the difficulties of dispensing with the cooperation of share-
holders, see Dodd, supra note 38, at 1123.
42. See LowENxTAL, op. cit. supra note 6, 155, 187; S. E. C. rsonr, op. cit. supra
note 11, Part I, 872-3. The support of the indenture trustee was required in order to
prepare for reorganization in advance of his announcement of default and to control
possible foreclosure proceedings. The trust companies found it profitable to follow the
bankers and secure some of the lucrative reorganization business-depositary fees,
certification fees, etc.
43. Disputes were largely with "outside groups," since the banker-controlled com-
mittees cooperated with the reorganizers. S. E. C. REoar, op. cit. supra note 11, Part I,
878-883. Sometimes outside dissenters possessed enough obstructive power to exact
valuable concessions. But when the reorganizers chose to proceed without placating a
weaker outside group, the latter usually found it very difficult to get any help from the
court, which was often swayed by the number of votes behind the reorganizers' plan.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The framers of Section 77 recognized that a successful reorganization
required such leadership, but sought to curb its ill effects by removing the
banker, motivated by self-interest, and by substituting the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.44 It seems, however, that the Commission has been un-
willing to assume the banker's burden. Conflicts within and among different
classes of security holders have not been smoothed over by conciliation and
compromise under Commission guidance, but have been sharpened by legal-
istic arguments before the Commission as to the "justice" of the respec-
tive claims.45 The manner in which the Bureau of Finance has failed to
coordinate the desire of all parties to negotiate is strikingly illustrated in
the case of the Western Pacific, the single Class I carrier for which the Bu-
reau has recommended a plan.46 The railroad's capital structure is simple.
There are first mortgage bondholders, three junior creditors47 and one hold-
ing company stockholder. Two major disputes divide the parties. The three
junior creditors, owning notes which are secured in varying proportions by
a General and Refunding Mortgage, contest among themselves whether ap-
portionment of new securities should be based on the face value of the notes
or on the collateral holdings. The second conflict is the usual one over alloca-
tion of new stocks and bonds among the three classes of investors.48 Separate
plans were submitted to the Bureau by the debtor, the first mortgage bond-
holders, and by one of the junior creditors.4 9
Extensive public hearings were held before a single examiner, to whom
briefs were submitted. No compromise among the parties was arranged
under Commission leadership. Instead, the Bureau of Finance prepared a
report, much in the manner of a judicial opinion, which rejected the three
plans proposed and announced a fourth of its own.0 In addition to inserting
provisions which aim to protect the public interest,5 1 the Bureau has attempted
to adjudicate purely inter-party differences. 52 Exceptions to this plan have
44. See statement of Senator Couzens, 76 CoNG. REc. 5127 (1933); Craven and
Fuller, supra note 18, 1284-5.
45. See, e.g., Brief on behalf of the Insurance Group Committee in the Denver and
Rio Grande Western reorganization, Finance Docket No. 11,002.
46. The history of the Western Pacific proceedings may be found in the Interstate
Commerce Commission's Finance Docket No. 10,913.
47. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Railroad Credit Corporatiorn, and A. C.
James Co., a banking firm closely identified with the railroad.
48. There is also a third, but minor point of disagreement on whether the First
Mortgage or the General and Refunding Mortgage has a prior lien upon the Northern
California Extension, a newly-constructed branch line expected to be of great value
to the company. See Alley, An Appraisal of Some Phases of the Corporate Reorganiza-
tion Statutes (1937) 3 Coap. REoRG. 443, 450, note 131.
49. A. C. James Co. filed a plan in October, 1936. See (1936) 143 Comm. & FIN.
CHToN. 2868.
50. The Report is given in (1937) 145 CoM. & FIN. CHRON. 963.
51. See notes 82, 84 infra.
52. New securities were awarded to the junior creditors on the basis of collateral
holdings rather than the face value of the notes, while the strict priority rights of the
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been filed by nearly all disputants, and hearings will soon commence before
the Commission proper. After two years of 77 proceedings, the three classes
all disagree with the Commission and are no nearer an agreement among
themselves.
Barring extraordinary coercion by Commission and Court,53 no plan can
succeed without the support, obtained by mutual negotiation and compromise,
of each organized group which controls enough votes to block ratification by
its class. A decision by an impartial tribunal as to relative legal rights makes
each class feel that it has been given too little and deprived of too much. Of
course, the parties themselves are to blame for the legalistic nature of the
arguments. Although bondholders have always indulged in voluminous dis-
cussion of creditors' rights, they have done so only as a preliminary to com-
promise and eventual agreement5 4 So long as secondary creditors and stock-
holders have the power to impede any reorganization which attempts to pro-
ceed without them, the theoretical priorities of different classes are useful
only as bargaining weapons. History of past reorganizations indicates that
while occasional victories have been won for priorities in the Supreme Court
after protracted litigation, the senior bondholders prefer to compromise their
differences, paying in theoretical legal rights for actual cooperation of junior
interests in restoring the company's credit, 5 and in returning the property
to private management.
But since strategy and often stubbornness forbid a class of security holders
to suggest compromise itself, lest the offer be interpreted as a sign of weak-
ness, some "outside" conciliator must take the initiative. This was formerly
the banker's function. Today, round table conference under Commission
leadership seems the wisest solution.
Administration of similar problems in the reorganization of industrial cor-
porations under Section 77B suggests a method of supplying the missing
initiative. When banker leadership has not already composed interparty
differences, the Bankruptcy Court has often summoned all of the disputants
to an informal conference in chambers. Under the respected persuasion of
the judge, empty discussions of rights are quickly transformed into serious
First Mortgage Bondholders have not been observed. The holding company stock-
holder, Western Pacific Railroad Corp., is to be admitted upon subscribing for the
new $10000,.000 first 4% mortgage upon terms so advantageous that the bonds vill
probably bring more than par in the market. See, as criticizing the above provisions,
In re Western Pacific R. R*. Reorganization, Finance Docket 10913, Brief for Bond-
holder group in Support of Exceptions to Proposed Report of the Bureau of Finance,
also Brief for A. C. James Co., a Secured Creditor, in Support of Exceptions.
53. Even if whole classes reject the plan, the court may yet approve if it believes
that the plan "makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment for the interests
or claims of all those rejecting it." See note 85 infra, for discussion of this power.
54. See analysis by Foster, supra note 38, 951-954.
55. Ibid. at 927.
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negotiation.56 Similarly, a Commissioner, or an Examiner from the Bureau
of Finance could arrange for and direct informal meetings5 7 throughout the
period of negotiation and formulation of a plan, and firmly insist upon the
compromise of interparty disputes. His prestige, and his assurance of Com-
mission cooperation, would hasten resolution of conflicts." Such a course
must have been considered by the Commission. Hesitation has probably been
due to several factors. The Interstate Commerce Commission is an estab-
lished, quasi-judicial body some fifty years of age. Its methods are settled-
lengthy public hearings characterize its procedure, which is well suited to its
normal rate making and abandonment functions.ri As there are eleven Com-
missioners, the one presiding at the proposed informal meeting can not speak
for the others, for the system of revolving the chairmanship has prevented
continued coordination of policy under one leadership. It is a strange paradox
that a judicial tribunal can successfully administrate informal negotiation
and compromise in 77B proceedings, while an administrative agency is so
awed by its own judicial prestige that it is unable to do the same for 77.00
It is conceivable that negotiation and compromise might be dispensed with
in cases where all security holdings are small and widely dispersed."1 Be-
wildered by the intricacies of the plan, ignorant of their collective power to
obtain better terms, and anxious to salvage something as soon as possible,
56. The soundness of the plans evolved has, hoivever, been questioned. See Com-
ment, (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 229, 237; Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developments under
Section 77B (1935) 30 ILL. L. REV. 137, 176.
57. Reorganization negotiation might be analogized to political "log-rolling." Prac-
tical statesmanship must recognize that both are necessary, and that neither can flourish
in the open.
58. With a Commissioner presiding, none of the negotiators could "walk out" and
refuse to compromise, for fear of incurring the displeasure of the tribunal which must
eventually recommend a plan. Speedy settlement would probably be the usual result
of a round-table parley. The plan agreed upon, supported by both Commission and
investors, would have little trouble getting through the court.
59. Since 1920, the Commission has also been charged with the duty of approving
all issues of securities. While the time consumed by the Bureau of Finance and the
Finance Division in investigating each application is perhaps unavoidable, it would
be impossible for underwriters to agree with the railroad upon terms of the offering
and then wait idly for over a month while the Commission approved the issue. The
practice has therefore developed of marketing securities to the ultimate purchdsers
before Commission approval, on an "if, as and when" basis. Experience since 1920 has
indicated that there are definite precedents upon the basis of which Commission approval
may be safely predicted.
60. This statement is not intended to reflect upon the Commission's methods in
discharging its duties of rate making, valuation, supervision of accounting practices,
and the approval of security issues. Adjudication after investigation may be the best
method of administering such responsibilities. But it is submitted that the problems
of reorganization cannot be solved by such an approach. See page 261, infra.
61. In the reorganization of the Missouri Pacific system, there are 50,000 bond-
holders, 10,000 stockholders, and 2,500 general unsecured creditors. See Craven and
Fuller, supra note 18, 56 n. 8.
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scattered investors might approve any proposal. Generally, however, there
are active groups within many classes which control enough votes to block
ratification. Numerous insurance company-savings bank coalitions have
assembled sizeable bond holdings which make their consent desirable,0 while
other large creditors, like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, own the
majority of claims in their class, and their assent to the plan must be obtained.
In addition junior securities of certain roads, such as the Western Pacific, are
owned by a few major investors. The Commission would be constrained to
defer to the wishes of the powerful blocs and promote an agreement among
them, in order to consummate reorganization.
Some method should be devised, however, which would prevent the strong-
er groups from utilizing their bargaining position to create discriminations
against other classes having no such concerted voting strength. Significant
organization of scattered small investors has always been difficult to achieve.
Under the equity system, the majority of these investors were supposedly
represented by protective committees which obtained deposits of securities
before approving a plan. But these committees were sometimes mere pup-
pets, created by reorganization banker-managers and manipulated by them at
will, often with no thought to the real interest of the security holders who had
deposited their certificates. 3 The control over protective committees given
to the Commission by Section 77 has been used to impose stringent limitations
upon their personnel and activities. 4 For this reason, and perhaps because
the notorious lethargy of small investors cannot be overcome except by high-
pressure methods of solicitation, now disapproved, protective committees
have been unable to obtain many deposits of securities.m The institutional.
investors who contributed largely to the strength of the committees have
preferred under Section 77 to organize as groups of mutual institutions,
under which category their activities are exempt from Commission scrutiny"
62. Such combinations exist in the reorganizations of the Chicago & Eastern
Illinois, M61onon, Milwaukee, Rock Island, Missouri Pacific, Frisco, Western Pacific
and probably many others. See generally RAmwAy & INDUSTRIAL CoMPEZruuD (May
1937).
63. Allegedly of such a nature were the committees in the Milwaukee reorganiza-
tion of 1926-1928. For extensive criticism of the committees and the deposit agreemnt,
see LowENTHAL, stpra note 6, 163-196, 307-348. See also Jackson, Security Holder
Representation in 77B Proceedings (1936) 2 CoRe. REoRo. 308.
64. § 77 p states that no protective committee can solicit deposits or proxies without
the approval of the Commission, obtained by filing an exhaustive statement pursuant
to a Regulation established by an order issued at a general session of the I. C. C. on
Oct. 23, 1935. C. C. H. Bank. Serv. 12001 (1936).
65. A Rock Island Committee, however, has obtained deposits of more than 60%
of the bonds in its class (RAILWAY AND INDUSTRIAL CoMIPENDIM (May, 1937) 61,
while a committee for the First Terminal Bonds of the St. Louis Southwestern has
secured 22% of its issue. (1937) 144 Comm. & FiN. CunoN. 2146.
66. Due to the restrictions upon protective committees, these interests have usually
intervened as "groups of not more than twenty-five bona fide holders of securities
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Smaller investors, however, have remained unorganized."7 Their privilege to
intervene and state their views is rarely exercised. Even should occasional
security holders appear, they could only advocate; they would be unable to
compose differences existing between whole classes either by negotiation or
otherwise, for they could speak for no one but themselves.
The average investor is unfamiliar with reorganization technique; his in-
terests can best be defended by experts. It has been suggested that the col-
lective power of scattered security holders can most effectively be realized
though representation before the Commission by selected delegates.08 To
achieve a bargaining strength comparable to that of the powerful organized
groups, these delegates should be empowered to bind investors in advance,
for representatives with sufficient votes to block any unfavorable plan would
be able to exact better terms from other classes of securities 0 9
While a system of representation would afford a satisfactory method of
equalizing bargaining power, practical drawbacks might be found in devising
an election machinery which would overcome the inertia of small investors
and insure the selection of bona fide delegates. The representatives would
perform much the same functions as protective committees, and a possible
consequence might be the return of financial groups to a position of control.
Financial experts and corporation lawyers are the logical delegates, but they
are found chiefly in the service of insurance companies, savings and commer-
cial banks, investment houses, trust companies and the railroads themselves,
and might be influenced by the banker-management group. But the Com-
mission could disqualify those clearly associated with the former manage-
ment and by continuing supervision of the reorganization process, could pre-
vent any representative from abusing his position. If the Commission were
to preside at conferences throughout the bargaining period, the financial
groups would probably be unable to acquire a control of the process com-
parable to their domination in equity. At any rate, the services of these ex-
perts are required, and bona fide performance of their duties is not inconceiv-
able. Forty thousand bondholders would find it difficult to settle terms at a
"town meeting". Vicarious negotiation cannot be avoided.,10
. . . or groups of mutual institutions" (§ 77p), under which classification they may
freely pool their bonds and delegate representatives to speak for them.
67. But other groups take an exaggerated interest in the proceedings. Among
the interveners have been the National Bituminous Coal Commission, the Railway Con-
ductors of America, and four New England Governors objecting to Pennsylvania
control of the New Haven.
68. Foster, Book Review (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 352, 357.
69. Ibid. Closer control over representatives could be achieved, without materially
impairing bargaining strength, by permitting security holders to disaffirm allegedly
unsatisfactory action taken by their representatives, whose decisions would otherwise
be binding. Such a presumption of investor-assent in liquidation cases has been held
constitutional. In re Mortgage Commission (1175 Evergreen Ave.), 270 N. Y. 436,
1 N. E. (2d) 836 (1936) aff'd 299 U. S. 521 (1937).
70. See Foster, supra note 68.
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Several methods of selecting representatives seem feasible. The abuses con-
nected with the deposit agreement in equity receiverships militate against
the use of that device."1 Proxies, however, do not lend themselves so readily
to unethical practice. Prior to the construction of a plan, regular elections
of negotiators could be held under Commission auspices.72 Like the present
method of dealing with reorganization trustees, the Commission could fix
salaries, set qualifications, and ratify successful candidates. Representation
of a class of bondholders could also be assumed by the custodian of the mort-
gage under the trust indenture. While the indenture trustee often is little
more than an escrow agent with composite duties to debtor and creditors, it
has recently been thought advisable to make his fiduciary duties more actual
than nominal. 73 As the bondholder's representative, he is already empowered
to take steps in default; little more would be required to enable him to nego-
tiate for investors in the formation of a reorganization plan."4 Bondholder
organization under the mortgage indenture has been attempted successfully
in Canada and England. Authorized by a vote of investors at regular meet-
ings, the trustee may extend maturity,"h lower the interest rate, modify other
terms of the mortgage, and participate in reorganization. 70 At similar meet-
ings the bondholders could focus their power in the trustee and authorize him
to negotiate for them in preparing a plan. Trust indentures are common in
many classes of secured and unsecured obligations."
A third type of representative, somewhat analogous to the defender as-
signed to an indigent respondent, might be more preferable. Despite wide-
spread investor apathy, there is usually a large security holder or group of
holders within each class which intervenes to protect its claims. After thor-
ough investigation of qualifications, the Commission could designate that
intervening group as the representative of the entire issue. Should no such
intervener appear, or should the intervener fail to qualify, the Commission
could itself appoint competent representation for the class. Unless investors
made some move to dislodge them, delegates for all issues could then be given
power to negotiate with each other for speedy formulation of a plan under
71. See note 63 supra.
72. As suggested by Foster, supra note 68, "Let machinery be provided for bond-
holder-election of representatives by plurality or majority vote, or by cumulative
voting, with open or closed primaries, with requirements that candidates disclose, or
free themselves from, inconsistent interests; place limits upon campaign expnses,
et cetera."
73. The recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, contained
in S. E. C. REPoRT, supra note 11, Part V1, have been embodied into the Barkley
Bill, S.2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
74. See for a similar suggestion, Posner, The Trustee atid the Trust hidenlture-
A Further Study (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 737, 798.
75. See Comment (1937) 46 YArz L. J. 1041.
76. A typical Canadian trust indenture is set out in S. F_. C. RfxonT, sura note 11,
Part V1, 164.
77. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 97.
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Commission guidance. They could be empowered to make compromise and
acquit legal claims through the course of bargaining process.7
8
If a plan were formulated by representatives under Commission super-
vision and approved by the court, subsequent ratification by investors would
be reduced to a mere rubber-stamping process. Approval of groups control-
ling large blocks of votes would usually have been obtained during the course
of negotiation, while scattered small security holders either would neglect to
exercise their franchise or, anxious to terminate the trusteeship, would con-
sent to any proposal. The formality of postponing investor consent until
after a plan has been negotiated seems artificial and unnecessary.
79
As a corollary to adequate machinery for the protection of investors' in-
terests, guardianship of the public welfare is required during the formulation
of a plan. Although 77 designates the Commission as the representative of
the public interest, 0 the scope of the tribunal's duties in that respect is
undefined. Since public interest is a conveniently vague phrase bristling with
argumentative connotations, it would be advisable to discover which phases
of a reorganization clearly concern the common welfare. At present, railroads
are required to supply efficient service at reasonable rates. The public welfare
thus assumes a double aspect -protection of the public at large as the
consumer of railroad services, and protection of the investor. The interest
of the first group demands low fixed charges and satisfactory provisions
for future financing, so that the road may operate without recourse either
to the Government's coffers for loans"' or to the Government's courts and
administrative agencies for repeated reorganization. In furtherance of these
aims, a low capital structure8 2 and the elimination of hybrid securities might
78. A possible analogy is offered by Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64 (1935), where
under a Mississippi statute permitting reopening of a closed bank if approved by three-
fourths of the depositors, the court appointed representatives to speak for depositors
in the course of negotiation. As part of the reorganization plan, the delegates waived
the statutory double liability of the shareholders in return for contribution by the
latter of new money to the enterprise. Despite the contention of a dissatisfied minority
depositor that the waiver of liability without his consent constituted a denial of due
process, the plan of reorganization was upheld.
79. The ratification provisions of the act have been criticized as a mere "will-o'-
the-wisp" based upon the illusion of ratification which was the traditional technique
of the equity-reorganizer. See Foster, supra note 68.
80. See § 77 d.
81. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is a creditor of every' major railroad
in reorganization.
82. The Bureau of Finance has recommended a capitalization of $91,406,510 for
the Western Pacific, as contrasted with the present capital structure of about $150,000,000,
and a valuation base for rate making purposes set by the Commission at $146,940,649.
See (1937) 145 Commr. & FIN. CHRON. 963.
It may be, however, that the Western Pacific proposal is a mere trial balloon sent
up by the Commission as a warning of what will happen if the parties fail to agree
among themselves. Should all the interests in a particular reorganization reach an
agreement on the details of a plan based upon a much higher capitalization than the
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also be required8 3 Since such steps toward a sound financial framework
also involve possible benefits to investors,84 it is clearly wilhin the province
of the public interest to set maximum limits for debt charges and capital-
ization. Within these bounds, however, there is still to be solved the major
problem of a reorganization plan-such allocation of new securities as will
resolve conflicting claims of different investor-groups.
By shifting focus from the public at large to the investor public, and by
expanding the flexible notion of public interest, it can be argued that it
is the duty of the Commission to pass judgment upon these inter-party
disputes. Where security-holdings are small and scattered, and adequate
representation is difficult to achieve, it might be practical for the Commission
to assume this greater burden and write a plan attempting to adjudicate
conflicts among classes. But where powerful investor groups exist which
control enough votes to block ratification, a plan of Commission authorship
can hardly be consummated,85 unless the proposal is equally appealing to all
classes. Within these two extremes are many cases in which it would be
difficult to predict the practical consequences of Commission adjudication.
But the hypothesis of a plan written by a government agency is an exten-
sion,, unwarranted by the present framework of 77, of the traditional concept
that reorganization is primarily a composition with creditors, worked out
by the investors themselves. In addition to resolution of questions which are
clearly problems of public interest, the Commission's present functions appear
to be to proffer ethical suggestions respecting contradictory investor-claims,
and to stimulate accords by encouraging a process of negotiation among
representatives of the various investor classes.
Bureau of Finance would prefer, it is not unlikely that the Commission would never-
theless approve. Termination of the receivership, return of the road to the control of
its owners, with its beneficial effect upon railroad securities generally, might le felt
to outweigh possible advantages of a smaller capital structure.
83. The Bureau's Reports for the Louisiana & N. V. R. R. [see (1937) 144
Comm. & FIx. CHR N. 2134] and for the Spokane International [see (1937) 145
Comm. & FIN. CimoT. 622] both recommend substitution of common and preferred
stock for the debentures and income bonds proposed by the parties for distribution to
former first mortgage bondholders. Future financing would be simplified by the elim-
ination of income bonds and similar hybrids.
84. But investor representatives have raised strong objections to such proposals.
See statement of Spokane International bondholder committee in (1937) 145 Co-..
& FiN. CHRON. 622; see Brief on behalf of Bondholder Group in support of Exceptions
to the Report of the Bureau of Finance, pp. 6-8, Western Pacific R. R. Reorganization,
Finance Docket 10913.
85. The consent of investors could be dispensed with, however, if the plan, in
the opinion of the court, "makes provision for fair and adequate treatment for the
interests and claims of all those rejecting it." Adoption of such a course, however,
seems unlikely. The judge would probably be very reluctant to approve as fair and
equitable a plan opposed by a majority of investors. In addition, the constitutionality
of the above provision has been doubted by all but one of its commentators. See FIN-
LETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1937) 448; Friendly, stpra note 18,
32-36. But see Craven and Fuller, id. at 1278.
